



Ukraine Military Dispositions

The Military Ticks Up while the Clock Ticks Down

Igor Sutyagin and Michael Clarke

On 2 April, NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe General Philip M Breedlove made it clear that the Alliance is about to announce a series of military measures to demonstrate that it is still a working military command structure capable of defending all its external borders. These measures are designed both to reassure NATO's eastern members and to send a loud message to Russia's President Vladimir Putin that military adventures in the former Soviet space would create an even more dangerous crisis for Europe than the seizure of Crimea. No one, including Putin, knows what he may do next as the situation changes. The crisis in Ukraine raised the Crimea issue for him both as a difficult problem as well as an opportunity, and he apparently chose to seize the opportunity without much anticipation of the cost.

For that reason alone, NATO officials have something to worry about. Alongside the political initiatives to create a negotiated outcome and the sanctions to apply pressure on the Russian leadership, there is a military dynamic that is becoming more worrying and urgent. Russian troop deployments – amounting to nearly 50,000 personnel – are noted in Figure 1, with their reserve elements behind them. Ukrainian troop dispositions as of a month ago are illustrated in Figure 2, though this analysis is now becoming outdated since it is known that some Ukrainian forces have begun to take up positions in eastern Ukraine (see Box 1), drawing away from such a heavy concentration in the west. They appear to be doing this covertly, however, and it is not currently possible to locate all of their new positions.

Several trends are evident in these two diagrams. In Figure 1, the composite military formations 'Klimovo', 'L'gov', 'Belgorod' and possibly 'Polessya' are the most significant. These forces stand opposite Kiev and the regions to its east. Their disposition holds the capital and the Kiev government at risk in any attack and compels Ukraine to keep a significant proportion of its forces in that area and therefore not available to operate further east. The military

groups 'Taganrog' and 'Crimea' are the other key forces that would have the potential to open a secure land corridor into Crimea from Russia north of the Sea of Azov. Such a corridor would have far greater capacity in terms of transport and logistics than the tenuous link across the Kerch Strait at the south of the sea.

Box 1: Possible Ukrainian Troop Movements

It is apparent that the Ukrainian military is responding to the Russian build up.

To defend against the Russian military sub-groups 'Klimovo' and, possibly, 'L'gov', there are some signs that Ukrainians have relocated the following formations:

- 30th Mechanised Brigade (item #5 in Figure 2)
- 95th Air Mobile Brigade (#12)
- 72nd Mechanised Brigade (#16)
- 3rd Special Operations (Spetsnaz) Regiment (#23)

In addition, Ukraine has mobilised and increased the alert status of the 169th Training Centre (roughly equivalent to a reduced-strength motorised division, north-east of #3).

To defend against the sub-groups 'Rostov-Don' and 'Taganrog', there are also signs that Ukraine has moved the following formations to Donetsk Oblast:

- 25th Airborne Brigade (#26)
- And, possibly, components of the 17th Tank Brigade (#27).

To defend against sub-group 'Crimea', Ukraine has moved these formations to Kherson Oblast:

- Components of the 17th Tank Brigade (#27)
- 79th Air Mobile Brigade (#29)
- Components of the 28th Mechanised Brigade (#30).

To prevent the advance of Russian troops from Transnistria, these forces may have been relocated:

- Components of 28th Mechanised Brigade (#30)
- Components of 80th Air Mobile Regiment (#8).

Finally, to defend against sub-group 'Boguchar', this formation may have been moved to Luhansk Oblast:

- 93rd Mechanised Brigade (#24).

The Ukrainian army numbers around 70,000, but it is poorly equipped and would struggle to mobilise fully. In the event of a military clash, its formations would be locally outnumbered and certainly outgunned by Russian forces and their reserves. As Figure 2 indicates, they cannot quickly deploy in great



Figure 1: Potential Russian Military Moves into Ukraine and Known Redeployments.

numbers too far out of their western dispositions to do much about any Russian military incursions into the south-east of the country.

Importantly, most of the Russian units described in Figure 1 are at readiness – not on exercise – held in a pre-combat state that can only be maintained for a limited period. It is reported that these units include cyber capabilities and – tellingly – field hospitals among their forward formations. General Breedlove estimates that they would only need to fight for three to five days to accomplish initial objectives of a limited nature.

Four Military Scenarios

These troop dispositions suggest four military scenarios that now have to be factored into the political calculations.

The first scenario is that these dispositions are no more than muscle-flexing on the part of Moscow to persuade Ukraine and other powers that they must acquiesce to the seizure of Crimea quickly, or face something worse. In this scenario, Russian forces would be stood down quite quickly once the political process has given Putin the recognition of his *fait accompli* over the Crimea. But the probability of this scenario is diminished by the fact that Ministry of the Interior troops have been moved to high alert, troops whose purpose is the pacification of occupied populations (see the Appendix for a fuller discussion of their role).

The second scenario posits that Russian forces would covertly support, or even engineer, civil unrest throughout south-east Ukraine and use that as a pretext for opening the secure land corridor to Crimea through Donetsk,

Ukraine's Ground Forces

Researched by Dr Igor Sutyagin



- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1 – 51st mechanised brigade, Vladimir-Volynskiy | 16 – 72nd mechanised brigade, Belaya Tserkov' | 31 – 73rd Naval Special Operations (Spetsnaz) Centre, Ochakiv |
| 2 – 59th zenith-rocket (Air defence) regiment, Vladimir-Volynskiy | 17 – 1129th zenith-rocket (Air defence) regiment, Belaya Tserkov' | 32 – 11th Army aviation regiment (helicopters), Chornobaivka |
| 3 – 1st tank brigade, Goncharivske | 18 – 8th Special Operations (Spetsnaz) regiment, Khmelnytskyi | 33 – 101st Houseguards brigade, Kiev |
| 4 – 27th rocket-artillery (MLRS) regiment, Sumy | 19 – 19th missile brigade, Khmelnytskyi | 34 – 55th zenith-rocket (Air defence) regiment, Evpatoriya |
| 5 – 30th mechanised brigade, Novograd-Volynskiy | 20 – 107th rocket-artillery (MLRS) regiment, Kremenchukh | 35 – 36th coastal defence brigade, Pereval'ne |
| 6 – 1st Special Operations (Spetsnaz) regiment, Kiev | 21 – 128th mountain infantry brigade, Mukachevo | 36 – 801st Naval Special Operations (Spetsnaz) battalion, Feodosiya |
| 7 – 24th mechanised brigade, Yavoriv | 22 – 300th mechanised regiment, Chernivtsi | 37 – 5th Marine battalion, Feodosiya (belongs to the 36th Coastal defence brigade) |
| 8 – 80th air-mobile regiment, Lviv | 23 – 3rd Special Operations (Spetsnaz) regiment, Kirovohrad | |
| 9 – 16th Army aviation brigade (helicopters), Brody | 24 – 93rd mechanised brigade, Chirkass'ke | |
| 10 – 7th Army aviation regiment (helicopters), Kaliniv | 25 – 1039th zenith-rocket (Air defence) regiment, Khvardeyske | |
| 11 – 15th artillery regiment, Drogobych | 26 – 25th airborne brigade, Khvardeyske | |
| 12 – 95th air-mobile brigade, Zhitomyr | 27 – 17th tank brigade, Krivoy Rog | |
| 13 – 26th artillery brigade, Berdichiv | 28 – 55th artillery brigade, Zaporizhzhya | |
| 14 – 92nd mechanised brigade, Klugoshino-Bashkirivka | 29 – 79th air-mobile brigade, Mykolaiv | |
| 15 – 11th artillery brigade, Ternopil' | 30 – 28th mechanised brigade, Chornomor'ske | |

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Figure 2: Ukraine's Ground Forces, March 2014.

Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukraine would pay another territorial price of a further Russian illegal annexation.

The third scenario is that unrest and separatist pressures in south and eastern Ukraine, real or manufactured, may present a dangerous, but nevertheless tempting opportunity to split the country in two, south and east of the Dnieper River. Presidential elections in Ukraine on 25 May, particularly if they

are accompanied by some sort of shadow election for a 'President of South-East Ukraine', could spark the civil tension that might offer such a dangerous temptation. Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while it lasted as a secessionist entity, provides a historical parallel and there is evidence that Moscow is even encouraging the Serbs who once proclaimed their secession from Bosnia to voice their support for similar Russian separatist demands in Ukraine.

The fourth scenario would involve Russian troops executing a move of grand strategy, creating a western corridor from Transnistria in Moldova into Crimea through Odessa and Mykolaiv Oblasts, which would encompass the historic city of Odessa itself. This would be a more tenuous link than an eastern corridor, but it would bring a Russian ethnic community from Transnistria into a continuous corridor to the Russian homeland. Whether it would be sustainable in regions that are less than a third Russian-speaking is debateable, but it would constitute a bargaining chip of some importance if there were any initial acquiescence to it. It would likely only make sense in a total campaign to divide the country into a south and south-east, annexed and/or controlled by Russia on the one hand and a western rump governed from a vulnerable capital in Kiev on the other. Such an arc of 'new Russian' territory transforming the map of Black Sea Europe would be a fundamental challenge to the European order. It would represent a land grab from another independent European state – Moldova – and invite inter-communal violence that would affect the stability of even Romania, a NATO member. This scenario would represent a completely new departure in European security politics, more serious than almost anything seen during the Cold War, let alone since that time.

Geopolitical Realities

There are some stark geopolitical realities that make several of these scenarios more plausible – incentivising aggressive action by Putin – even if they are not so far the most likely.

Energy

The first is that Russia's Gazprom has taken control of all Ukraine's off-shore oil and gas fields in the Sea of Azov. Previously, European companies had been promised licenses to operate in these areas, so Gazprom could face some legal challenges. Nevertheless, an eastern corridor into Crimea from the Russian homeland would cut Ukraine off from the Sea of Azov and make it part of Russian territory. The long-running dispute over the Kerch Strait would also be removed by such an annexation of territory.

Food

Crimea is dependent on Ukraine for 85 per cent of its food supplies. Crimea continues to be supplied from the rest of Ukraine, but road transportation

currently takes around two days from mainland Ukraine to the Crimean capital of Simferopol with many border checks (established by the Crimean authorities) involved. The ferry across the Kerch Strait can only handle 400 people or 60 vehicles per hour, while the Port of Kerch has very poor facilities and no refrigeration for food and perishables. In this situation, food supplies in Crimea are already under strain and cannot be easily met by air and sea supply from Russia. The opening of a secure land corridor would mitigate the problem immediately.

Military Imports

Of Russia's total imports, only 4.4 per cent come from Ukraine, but they are vital for some key elements of Russia's military establishment. Some 30 per cent of Ukrainian military exports to Russia are unique and cannot currently be substituted by Russian production. Russia's heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (the SS-18 ICBMs) are designed and produced by the Yuzhmash combine in Dnepropetrovsk. SS-18s are regularly checked and maintained by Yuzhmash specialists. Two other strategic missile systems – the SS-25 (RT-2PM Topol) and the SS-19 (UR-100 NUTTKh) – are designed and produced by Russian-based enterprises, but use guidance systems designed and produced in Ukraine by the Kharkiv-based Khartron Scientific-Industrial Combine. The SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25 currently make up some 51 per cent of Russia's overall strategic nuclear-weapons inventory and over 80 per cent of that of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces specifically. In addition, some 20 per cent of the natural uranium currently consumed by Russia's nuclear industry, both for civilian and military purposes, comes from Zholtiv in Ukraine.

Since Soviet days, Russia's ship-building programme has heavily depended on gas-turbine engines and gears produced in Mykolaiv, Ukraine. While Russian industry has learned how to build large gas-turbine engines since then, it cannot yet master manufacturing the gears for them and Russia requires Ukrainian-produced gears for 60 per cent of the surface combatants planned for its navy.

The Russian air force is also critically dependent on the Ukrainian defence industry. Ukrainian enterprises produce the R-27 (the AA-10 Alamo) medium-range air-to-air missile (AAM), as well as the seekers for the R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range AAM – which, between them, represent the majority of anti-air missiles operated by Russian fighters. Many of the auxiliary systems – from hydraulics to drogue parachutes – for the Russian Su-27, Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, as well as for Russia's newest Su-34, are also produced in Ukraine. In Zaporizhia, the Motor-Sich plant has a major role in Russian aviation. Motor-Sich produces jet engines for a variety of Russian transport jet aircraft, including the An-124 Ruslan, the largest Russian transport aircraft, as well as for some combat and training aircraft. The plant also produces engines for all Russian combat and transport helicopters, as well

as auxiliary power units for all Russian helicopters and many types of combat and transport aircraft.

Russia has made a vast effort to reduce its dependence upon Motor-Sich engines, but the evidence is that it cannot produce enough engines to meet its own demand – to say nothing of an ambitious rearmament programme, which looks as if it will require at least 3,000 helicopter engines in a two-to-three year period to equip Russian forces.

Russia's dependence on Motor-Sich also has the effect of restricting its own military and aviation exports. For the period 2013–16, Russia has secured contracts for the delivery of over 260 new helicopters around the world, all of which are equipped with either main or auxiliary engines supplied by the Ukrainian company. On 28 March, the state-owned company that controls all Ukrainian armaments and military-related production – Ukroboronprom – announced a freeze on all future supplies to Russia. The effects of this freeze on Russian military production as well as its export potential will certainly be felt in the medium term, if not immediately.

This military dependence on Ukrainian production could be read in one of two ways. We might assume that it increases Putin's incentive to find a peaceful resolution in his relationship with Ukraine, so that supplies are not interrupted and Russia has more time to decrease its critical military dependencies on Ukrainian production. In light of the Crimea takeover, that dependence will not likely be relieved quickly by the Ukrainians.

Equally, however, it could be argued that since most of the military plants in question are in south and east Ukraine, the temptation to follow the third and fourth scenarios will be all the greater. To suggest these scenarios for the sake of capturing the production at these various plants would be a very nineteenth-century way of looking at a twenty-first century relationship. However, even that cannot be ruled out in current circumstances.

The Next Month

The month of May will be a critical time. Until Ukraine's elections take place in May, the government in Kiev lacks legitimacy, and that fact continues to support Russia's patterns of behaviour in arguing that it is protecting Russian speakers in Crimea from violence. If the elections go well in May, then Putin's claims to be acting for humanitarian motives will be severely diminished. On the other hand, if the elections do not go well and are accompanied by competing shadow elections in other parts of the country, the resulting confusion and even violence may present further, albeit dangerous, opportunities to strengthen Russia's position around the Black Sea. In addition, Russian troops, at readiness now for over two to three weeks, will be approaching eight weeks at readiness by early to mid May; at this point,

combat effectiveness tends to wear off. Troops can only be held at readiness for so long before systems have to be replaced and rotated and inefficiencies set in. Not least, the rotation of conscript troops in Russia's forces is already underway from 1 April to 15 July, and the disruptive effects of this may also create a substantial loss of combat effectiveness. Russian commanders will be aware that they will have to decide to use their troops or stand them down sometime before the summer.

What we have set out here are scenarios based on current knowledge. They are not predictions nor are they a complete picture of a complex and dynamic situation. Nevertheless, the military dispositions of Ukrainian and Russian forces are becoming more relevant to the political equation, and for a range of reasons they may reduce the time in which politics and negotiation can mitigate the effects of this crisis.

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Appendix

The Russian Ministry of Defence troop deployment consists of four groups and two other supposed (but unconfirmed) groupings. Troops are mainly organised in battalion tactical groups (BTGr). The difference between a Russian BTGr and a British battlegroup is that a BTGr represents a battalion supplemented by non-organic elements (usually a tank company and an artillery battery) *attached* to the battalion and subordinated to the battalion's commanding officer. A battlegroup, meanwhile, although flexible in its organisation, is traditionally a battalion with one of its sub-units *substituted* by that of another unit, with various other support elements attached (for example, an armoured infantry battalion with a tank squadron *instead* of one of its organic infantry companies).

Northern Group^a

Element	Personnel
Klimovo Sub-Group	
2 x BTGr of the 51 st Guards Parachute Regiment/106th Guards Airborne Division	
1 x artillery battalion of the 1182 nd Guards Airborne Artillery Regiment/106 th Guards Airborne Division	
6 th Tank Brigade	
1 x battalion of the 2 nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
L'gov Sub-Group	
2 x BTGr of the 1 st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment/2 nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 147 th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment/2 nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division	
13 th Guards Tank Regiment/4 th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division ^b	
1 x battalion of the 2 nd Spetsnaz Brigade	
Reserves	
15 th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment/2 nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 147 th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment/2 nd Guards Tamanskaya Division	
12 th Guards Tank Regiment/4 th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 275 th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment/4 th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division	
Total	9–9,400

Belgorod Group

Element	Personnel
27 th Guards Motor Brigade	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 147 th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment/2 nd Guards Tamanskaya Division	
1 x BTGr of the 15 th Motor Rifle Brigade ^c	
3 x BTGr of the 104 th Guards (234 th Guards?) Air Assault Regiment/76 th Guards Air Assault Division	
1 x BTGr of the 51 st Guards Airborne Regiment/106 th Guards Airborne Division	
1 x BTGr of the 137 th Guards Airborne Regiment/106 th Guards Airborne Division	
(Probably) 1 or 2 x BTGr of the 234 th Guards Air Assault Regiment/76 th Guards Air Assault Division	
2 x battalions of the 16th Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
Reserves^d	
2 x BTGr of the 23 rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade ^e	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 275 th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment/4 th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division	
Total	8,000

Donbass Group

Element	Personnel
Boguchar Sub-Group^f	
2 x BTGr of the 20 th Guards Motor Rifle brigade	
1 x battalion of the 10 th Spetsnaz GRU brigade	
Rostov-Don Sub-Group^g	
2 x BTGr of the 137 th Guards Paratroop Regiment/106 th Guards Airborne Division	
1 x self-propelled artillery battalion of the 1182 nd Guards Airborne Artillery Regiment/106 th Guards Airborne Division	
1 x battalion of the 22 nd Guards Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
2 x battalions of the 943 rd Rocket-Artillery (MLRS) Regiment	
Reserves	
56 th Air Assault Brigade	
Total	8,000

Tavriya Group

Element	Personnel
Taganrog Sub-Group	
2 x BTGr of the 205 th Motor Rifle Brigade	
1 x or 2x BTGr of the 98 th Guards Airborne Division	
1 x battalion of the 346 th Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
1 x battalion of the 25 th Spetsnaz GRU Regiment	
Sub-total	3,000
Crimea Sub-Group	
810 th Marines Brigade	
31 st Guards Air Assault Brigade	
1 x BTGr of the 18 th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade	
1 x BTGr of the 15 th Motor Brigade	
1 x battalion of the 943 rd Rocket-Artillery (MLRS) Regiment	
1 x battalion of the 22 nd Guards Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
1 x battalion of the 3 rd Guards Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
1 x battalion of the 45 th Spetsnaz Regiment of Airborne Troops	
Sub-total	7,800
Reserves	
33 rd Mountain Infantry Brigade	
34 th Mountain Infantry Brigade	
7 th Air Assault Division	
Sub-total	12,500
Total	23,300

Transnistria Group

Plans to use these units in the prospective operation against Ukraine are questionable and are not confirmed by any reliable sources.

Element	Personnel
82 nd Motor Rifle Battalion	
113 th Motor Rifle Battalion	
2 x battalions of the 3 rd Guards Spetsnaz GRU Brigade	
Total	1,600

Polesnya Group (Belarus)

There have been reports of the presence of up to 1,800 servicemen (a full regiment) of the 137th Guards Paratroop Regiment from the 106th Guards Airborne Division in plain clothes on the territory of Belarus. But this is implausible, given that it is known that the troops of the 106th are deployed elsewhere.

One cannot exclude the possibility that personnel of the 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment (or possibly the 104th Guards Air Assault Regiment) of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, in plain clothes, might be present in Belarus.

However, the presence of these troops is uncertain, while plans to use these units in the prospective operation against Ukraine are highly questionable and have not been confirmed by reliable sources.

Ministry of Defence troops in areas adjacent to the border are partially located beyond a 50-kilometre zone from the border itself, which is still within an hour's reach of the Ukrainian territory. Any calculation of the number of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border depends on the counting method used. One approach is to tally manoeuvre units alone, that is, those combat units directly participating in operations, such as infantry, tank, special operations and artillery. This approach provides an estimate of approximately 48,500 troops.

The alternative approach is to consider all combat-support units (including electronic warfare, communications and engineers) and rear support units (including transportation, ammunition supply and so on). This approach provides an estimate of approximately 92–94,000 troops.

Since mid-March, high levels of activity among the Russian Military Air Transport Command's transport aircraft have been detected in areas adjacent to the Russo–Ukrainian border. The second-largest planes in the Russian fleet – An-22 Antey turboprop aircraft, designed to transport heavy armoured vehicles – are also participating in transportation operations. This level of activity is unprecedented in exercises and strongly suggests that these planes are ferrying supplies and equipment to troop concentrations – a clear sign of the seriousness of Russian intentions.

When Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu was called by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on 20 March, he reassured his US colleague that Russian military activity near the Ukrainian border represented no more than military exercises – but was unable to provide information on their planned duration. This is a clear sign that the Russian military machine is currently on a war-footing; further, the minister of defence has been bypassed, with the General Staff planning all operations and serving as the Supreme Commander's HQ, as is war-time practice. (According to the Russian constitution, the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces.)

Troops of the Ministry of Interior

There are also reports that troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs attached to the Central Regional Command of Internal Troops have been ordered to increase their readiness. This is a worrying sign, as the war-time task of troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is to pacify populations in occupied territory. The raised readiness of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs troops could therefore indicate the Kremlin's preparations to actually invade Ukraine – and to take measures to establish and maintain control of the occupied Ukrainian territories.

The troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs attached to the Central Regional Command of Internal Troops (the Central European part of Russia) include:

Operational units:

- 12th Division
- 55th Division
- 95th Division
- Separate Operational Division ‘Dzerzhinskiy’
- 21st Operational Special Purpose Brigade
- 5 x motor battalions.

Special operations units (battalion-sized):

- 25th Special Operations Detachment ‘Mercury’
- 33rd Special Operations Detachment ‘Peresvet’.

Internal troop divisions are manned by approximately 10,000 servicemen with armoured personnel carriers, artillery units, and around one battalion of tanks each.

Notes and References

- a. A relocation of Russian troops closer to the Russo–Ukrainian border was detected in this Group’s area by Ukrainian observers. The 13th Guards Tank Regiment supposedly relocated to concentrate on the unused airfield near the village of Sachkovichi.
- b. The 13th Guards Tank Regiment had moved closer to the border from the Reserves of Belgorod Group by 28 March.
- c. One BTGr of the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade previously in Belgorod Group had relocated to Donbass Group near Rostov-na-Donu and then withdrawn back to Samara by 1 April.
- d. The 13th Guards Tank Regiment had moved closer to the border from the Reserves of the Belgorod Group by 28 March.
- e. One BTGr of the 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, previously in Belgorod Group, had withdrawn to Samara by 1 April.
- f. The troops of Boguchar Sub-Group (deployed near Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast) had reportedly moved further away from the border by 29 March, according to Ukrainian observers.
- g. One BTGr of the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade, previously in Belgorod Group, had relocated to Donbass Group near Rostov-na-Donu and withdrawn to Samara by 1 April.

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